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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Mark Free timely appeals from the district court's order revoking probation. On
appeal, Mr. Free argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and
equal protection when it refused to augment the record with various transcripts he
requested to be created at the public's expense. Mr. Free also argues that the district
court abused its discretion when it denied his oral I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
motion requesting leniency.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Free was charged, by Information, with attempted strangulation, domestic
violence, and intimidation of a witness. (R., pp.52-54.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Mr. Free pleaded guilty to attempted strangulation and, in return, the State dismissed
the remaining charges.

(Tr., p.6, Ls.6-22; R., p.113.)

Thereafter, the district court

imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, but suspended the
sentence and placed Mr. Free on probation. (R., pp.113-117.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation and an
amended motion for probation violation alleging that Mr. Free violated various terms of
his probation. (R., pp.135-137, 147-149.) Mr. Free admitted to violating the terms of his
probation by violating a no contact order and disturbing the peace. (R., pp.148-150.)
The district court then revoked Mr. Free's probation, but retained jurisdiction.
(R., pp.152-154.) Upon review of Mr. Free's period of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter,
rider), the district court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Free on probation.
(R., pp.164-167.)
1

After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation alleging
that Mr. Free violated various terms of his probation.

(R., pp.186-189.)

Mr. Free

admitted to violating the terms of his probation by consuming alcohol, consuming
marijuana, and engaging in an unapproved romantic relationship.

(R., pp.186-189,

191.) At the probation violation disposition hearing, Mr. Free requested that the district
court revoke probation, but reduce the length of his sentence pursuant to Rule 35.
(Tr., p.54, L.13 - p.55, L.14.) The district court then revoked Mr. Free's probations and
executed the underlying sentence.

(R., pp.199-201.)

Mr. Free timely appealed.

(R., pp.202-204.)

Mr. Free then filed a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, which was denied by
the district court. 1 (R., pp.193-198.)
On appeal, Mr. Free's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record
with transcripts of the admit/deny hearing, held on August 17, 2009, the dispositional
hearing, held on October 19, 2009, the rider review hearing, held on April 19, 2010, and
the Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI), and to
suspend the briefing schedule pending preparation of the requested transcripts.
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support
Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) The State objected to Mr. Free's
request for the transcripts but not the APSI. (Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment
and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter,
Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered
an order granting Mr. Free's request for the APSI, but denied his request for the

1

Mr. Free is not raising the denial of his written Rule 35 motion as an issue on appeal.

2

transcripts.

(Order To Augment The Record In Part and to Suspend the Briefing

Schedule. (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)

3

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Free due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Free's oral Rule 35
motion requesting leniency, in light of the mitigating factors present in this
matter?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Free Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Free filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of the
admit/deny hearing, held on August 17, 2009, the dispositional hearing, held on
October 19, 2009, and the rider review hearing, held on April 19, 2010. Those requests
were denied by the Supreme Court.

On appeal, Mr. Free is challenging the Idaho

Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts.

Mr. Free asserts that the

requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether the district court abused its
sentencing discretion.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his

request.
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B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Free Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With The
Necessary Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Free With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate
Review Of His Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CONST.
art. I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

132 Idaho 88 (1998».

V.

Wood,

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh

V.

State, Dept. of

Health and Welfare ex reI. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).

In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a).

I. C. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to

6

"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).

Moreover, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an appeal

of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891
(Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under
Rule 35 is an appealable order pursuant to I.A.R. 11 (c)(6».
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. fIIinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

7

proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
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the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
In Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Bums, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The

9

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.

2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29,34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,

422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
10

Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review."

State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Free fails to

provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Free's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceeding were before the district court
at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the
transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge
gained from its own official position and observations.

Downing v. State, 136 Idaho

367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977)
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984)
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary
11

hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected
to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made its
sentencing determinations.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No 39057, 2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet final), which addressed
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 1.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the

terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 1-2.

After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on

probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and
the district court revoked probation.

The defendant appealed from the district

Id.

court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4.
12

While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point this
case is not final.

Moreover, it is distinguishable because Mr. Free is challenging the

length of his sentence, which entails an analysis of the district court's sentencing
rationale.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made

See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,

appropriate sentencing determinations.

28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2

2 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in
Hanington. Specifically it held:
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that all
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal."

Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and
Mr. Free is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.
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Further support for Mr. Free's position can be found in State v. Warren, 123
Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery
in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked
and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period
of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which
was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of
Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Court of Appeals
addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide the original PSI and a transcript
of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the original sentence was not on
appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals
held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error.
Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that hearing was created before
the probation violation hearing or that the district court referenced the original
sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing.

It appears that the

Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the
nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Free failed to request the transcript at issue, the
Warren opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's

decision to execute the original sentence.
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In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Free's request for the transcripts will
render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript
supports the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to
the review of Mr. Free's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore,
Mr. Free should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption
should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Free With Access
To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process Because He
Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[to] hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to,
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
15

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.

The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument.

Therefore, Mr. Free has not obtained

review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held

that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
16

counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence. . .. Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-B.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation.

Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Free on the

probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Free is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and effective
assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcripts.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Free his constitutional right to due
process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal.
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested
transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Free's Oral Rule 35 Motion
Requesting Leniency In light Of The Mitigating Factors Present In This Matter
Mr. Free argues that the unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, is
unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in this matter. A
motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under I.C.R. 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested
leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence
was reasonable." Id.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting

State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Free does not allege that his sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion,
Mr. Free must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was excessive
considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. Id.
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"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985).
There were mitigating factors before the district court at the time of sentencing
which, when viewed in light of the new information, provide further support for the
conclusion that Mr. Free's sentence is excessive.
addiction is a mitigating factor.
(Tr., p.38, Ls.3-6.)

Specifically, Mr. Free's substance

Mr. Free has a history with methamphetamine use.

At sentencing, his trial counsel noted that Mr. Free moved from

Nevada to Idaho to "get away from his mother, who is a drug addict, and to find a better
life, and to help himself stay clean, and he has done that." (Tr., p.38, Ls.10.)
Mr. Free's childhood abuse and unstable domestic environment are mitigating
factors. As a child, Mr. Free was physically abused by both his father and his step
mother.

(Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.?l

When he was

thirteen he remembers an incident where he was covered in bruises and ran away from
home to avoid further abuse. (PSI, p.?) Mr. Free was a straight A student in junior
high until he moved in with his mother to get away from his physically abusive father.
(PSI, p.?)

Mr. Free's mother was a drug addict and she taught him how to snort

methamphetamine because she would rather he learn how to do it from her than
somebody else.

(PSI, pp.?, 11-12.) Mr. Free's mother kicked him out of her house

when he was fourteen years old.

(PSI, p.?)

After that Mr. Free lived a "nomadic"

lifestyle hopping trains and hitchhiking around the country. (PSI, p.?)

3 The citations to the PSI and the various attachments will adhere to the preexisting
pagination contained in the electronic format.
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Further, Mr. Free was not totally responsible for the underlying offense.

The

victim told the presentence investigator that she contributed to the commission of the
underlying offense and that it was not entirely his fault. (PSI, p.100.) Mr. Free was also
stabbed with a knife by the victim during the fight which led to the underlying charges in
this matter. (PSI, p.39.) Despite the instant offense, Mr. Free did playa positive role in
the victim's life by helping her break a six year addiction to methamphetamine. (PSI,
p.100.)
Finally, Mr. Free's positive performance while on his rider is a mitigating factor.
While on his rider, Mr. Free completed all of his assignments in the new directions
program and "appears to have learned the concepts the program intends." (APSI, p.23.)

Mr. Free also participated in a volunteer anger management program and a

volunteer celebrate recovery program. (APSI p.3.) Mr. Free reached the highest level
of advancement in the individual Accountability model program, and earned a probation
recommendation from the department of correction. (APSI, pp.4-5.)
In sum, there are mitigating factors present in this matter which support the
conclusion that Mr. Free's sentence is excessively harsh and should have been reduced
in response to his oral Rule 35 motion upon the revocation of his probation.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Free respectfully
requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence. Alternatively, Mr. Free
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence.
DATED this

4th

day of September, 2012.
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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